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This brief was commissioned by the
Population Council to complement its two
previous comprehensive publications con-
cerning the TRY project: Tap and Reposition
Youth (TRY): Providing Social Support,
Savings, and Microcredit Opportunities for
Young Women in Areas with High HIV
Prevalence (SEEDS Pamphlet No. 23, 2006)
and Evaluation of a Savings and Micro-Credit
Program for Vulnerable Young Women in
Nairobi (2005).1 These two publications con-
tain a wealth of data and information essen-
tial for understanding the project and its
results, although they do not analyze the
microfinance component in depth. In con-
trast, this brief was written by microfinance
practitioners for a microfinance audience.
In 1998, two organizations with consid-
erable expertise in their fields came together
to develop a microfinance approach that
would address livelihood-strategy constraints
for adolescent girls at risk for HIV/AIDS in
an urban slum in Kenya. The first, the
Population Council, is an international,
nonprofit, nongovernmental organization
(NGO) that seeks to improve the well-being
and reproductive health of current and
future generations around the world and to
help achieve a humane, equitable, and sus-
tainable balance between people and
resources. The second organization, K-Rep,
is a well-known Kenyan microfinance insti-
tution (MFI).
The initiative was named the Tap and
Reposition Youth (TRY) program. The
objective of the program was to reduce ado-
lescent girls’ vulnerabilities to adverse social
and reproductive health outcomes by
improving their livelihoods options.
Adolescent girls are a particularly challenging
population, usually ignored by development
agencies. The adolescents in this project were
out-of-school girls and young women aged
16–22 residing in low-income and slum areas
of Nairobi. TRY used a group-based microfi-
nance model to provide credit, savings, busi-
ness support, and mentoring to program par-
ticipants. The project has gone through three
phases since its inception in 1999.
Results
The social, health, and financial results of the
TRY program are described in detail in vari-
ous publications available on the Population
Council website. This brief is a focused
analysis of the microfinance components of
the project and provides some illuminating
results. The authors hope that the broader
microfinance community will build upon the
lessons learned from the TRY program in
order to meet the financial needs of vulnera-
ble populations such as these urban adoles-
cent girls.
Lessons learned
The project demonstrated clearly that adoles-
cent girls can save and that they want contin-
uous access to their savings. In this project,
savings were held by the MFI as collateral for
the loans. If a girl wanted to use her savings,
she had to withdraw from the program,
which many girls did. Girls had their own
rotating savings and credit associations
(RoSCAs), formed either before or after they
entered the program. In the first two phases
of TRY, these RoSCAs were independent of
the TRY program. In the third phase, the
importance of these groups to the girls was
acknowledged, and the TRY program began
to encourage their formation. The great
majority of girls became RoSCA members. 
The girls disliked the pressure to take out
and repay loans. To stay in the groups, the
girls had to continue borrowing even when
they could not manage the repayments. The
constant pressure to make loan repayments
contributed to a high dropout rate. 




The adolescent girls in the program had
weak social networks. Theirs was a mobile
population. Girls often lived with people
other than their parents, and many had
migrated from other areas to Nairobi.  This
mobility meant that credit groups were
formed of girls who had not known each
other before they joined the program.
Consequently, the group-guarantee mecha-
nism did not function as well as it does in
adult models, and instead of guaranteeing
repayment, it increased dropout. Dropping
out carried a social cost: girls who had gained
friends and social support from group co-
members sometimes lost these friends and
networks if they started having repayment
problems as a result of the social pressure cre-
ated by the solidarity guarantee.
The credit component suffered from
delays in disbursements, for a variety of rea-
sons. One reason for this delay was the
requirement that disbursement could not
occur unless previously disbursed loans were
up to date. Management issues also caused
delays in disbursement. Adolescent girls dis-
like delays in loan disbursements just as
adults do. The girls became impatient at these
delays and dropped out. 
The business plan requirement exacer-
bated discontent and dropout. Girls found it
intimidating, complicated, and illogical.
Loan sizes and terms often did not match the
requirements of their business plans. Many
of the plans, therefore, were never imple-
mented.
The project was designed to benefit the
group “adolescent girls.” The results, howev-
er, showed that this category does not neces-
sarily consist of one market segment. With
TRY, older girls had greater success with
their businesses and with their loans, whereas
the younger girls had more difficulties and
dropped out with greater frequency. 
This brief offers recommendations, based
on the lessons learned, to MFIs who wish to
provide financial services to adolescent girls
and to social development organizations study-
ing girls’ livelihood possibilities. One sugges-
tion is to start with savings and training in
money management as an entry point for
working with younger adolescent girls.
Tailoring products and services specifically for
this entry-level group of clients will make them
more successful. Microfinance practitioners are
encouraged to take the lessons from this inno-
vative project and build upon them in order to
meet the needs of vulnerable girls and other
marginalized, at-risk populations. Research and
new product development should be part of
every institution’s mandate. In this way, MFIs
can create new markets, build client loyalty,
establish market niches, and, most important,
carry out their social missions. 
BACKGROUND
In 1998, two organizations with considerable
expertise in their different fields collaborated
to develop a microfinance approach to
addressing livelihood-strategy constraints for
adolescent girls at risk for HIV/AIDS in an
urban slum in Kenya. The first, the
Population Council, is an international, non-
profit, nongovernmental organization
(NGO) that seeks to improve the well-being
and reproductive health of current and future
generations around the world and to help
achieve a humane, equitable, and sustainable
balance between people and resources.
Established in 1952, the Council is governed
by an international board of trustees. It con-
ducts biomedical, social science, and public
health research and helps build research
capacities in developing countries. Its New
York headquarters supports a global network
of regional and country offices. The
Council’s work on adolescents has highlight-
ed the internal diversity of the adolescent
population and the importance of addressing
the different vulnerabilities and opportunities
that arise from age, gender, living arrange-
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ments, sexual activity, childbearing, and mar-
ital and schooling status. Since the mid-
1990s, much of the Council’s research and
policy activity has explored how best to
define and meet the needs of vulnerable ado-
lescent girls, including their livelihood
options and capacities.
The second organization, K-Rep, is a
well-known microfinance institution (MFI)
in Kenya. K-Rep was established in 1984 as a
project of World Education Incorporated
with the primary objective of channeling
financial assistance together with training
and technical assistance to Kenyan non-
governmental organizations involved in the
promotion of micro- and small enterprises.
In 1994, K-Rep began the process of form-
ing a microfinance bank, K-Rep Bank, which
was licensed in March 1999; it opened its
doors to the public in December 1999. K-
Rep has three wings: K-Rep Holding
Company, K-Rep Bank, and K-Rep
Development Agency (KDA, an NGO).
KDA is the organization’s research and devel-
opment arm. Its function is to carry out all
program microfinance research and innova-
tion activities, including identifying and test-
ing new systems, products, mechanisms, and
instruments. The joint initiative of the two
organizations was implemented by KDA.
This brief is written for microfinance
practitioners. Although other publications
are available concerning the TRY program,
and discuss it in greater depth, this docu-
ment specifically describes the project from
a financial services perspective.2 This brief is
intended to disseminate the lessons learned
during the program and encourage MFIs to
adapt and apply those lessons to their own
activities with regard to the most vulnerable
populations.
The executive summary of this brief is
followed by a discussion of Phase One of the
TRY initiative; subsequent sections describe
Phases Two and Three. The final sections
present recommendations and a conclusion.
The author, Joan Hall, is a microfinance
consultant experienced with microfinance
designed for young people. Aleke Dondo,
Chief Executive Officer of K-Rep Bank, and
Jennefer Sebstad, Consulting Associate to the
Population Council for adolescent liveli-
hoods, provided additional expertise. Both
Mr. Dondo and Ms. Sebstad were closely
involved with the TRY project. This brief is
based on a review of the extensive documen-
tation of the TRY project.
THE PHASES OF 
THE PROJECT
The initiative was named the Tap and
Reposition Youth (TRY) program. The over-
all aim of the program was to reduce adoles-
cent girls’ vulnerabilities to adverse social and
reproductive health outcomes by improving
their livelihoods options. The project target-
ed out-of-school adolescent girls and young
women aged 16–22 living in low-income
and slum areas of Nairobi. A rural program
was initiated at the same time. TRY used a
group-based microfinance model to provide
girls with access to credit, savings, business
support, and mentoring. 
The first phase of the project began in
1999 and ended in 2001. This was a mini-
malist phase, using a modification of K-
Rep’s adult methodology. The second phase,
begun in mid-2001 and ending in early
2004, added a component on strengthening
social structures for the girls in the program.
Phase Three emphasized savings and safe
3
2 Interested readers should refer to the SEEDS
issue describing the TRY project and the TRY




spaces for the girls. Each phase was designed
in response to the findings of the previous
phases. 
Phase One
Phase One, the pilot, was designed by the
Population Council and KDA specifically for
low-income slum-dwelling adolescent girls of
Nairobi, Kenya. As noted above, the
methodology was based on the adult model
used by K-Rep, which in turn was based on
the Grameen Bank microfinance model. The
principal product offered to girls was credit,
and compulsory savings formed the collateral
backing the loans. A loan officer delivered
these services in weekly meetings. 
Groups called watanos were formed of
five girls and were joined together to create a
larger group of 25 to 30 girls called a kiwa.
The watanos were responsible for ensuring
the compliance of their members with the
requirements of the program. A solidarity
guarantee was used. One hundred girls par-
ticipated in the pilot, and the program
reached its peak membership of 535 in 2004.
Some changes were made to the adult
methodology for the TRY pilot. The interest
rate was lowered from 18 percent to 15 per-
cent. Group members were not self-chosen,
but rather were recruited by KDA. Because
the girls came from a mobile population and
had few friends, creating a group of girls who
were known to each other was difficult.
Unlike the adult model, the TRY pilot
required the girls to develop a business plan
before receiving a loan, because many had no
prior business experience. Most had no
household assets, so there was no require-
ment to pledge assets as collateral, as in the
adult model. Girls were required to save 4
percent of the loan amount before receiving
a loan, rather than the 10 percent required of
adult borrowers. In the adult model, mem-
bers of a group could “rest,” that is, stay in
the group and keep saving without receiving
a loan. This option was not provided to girls
involved in the TRY program. They received
business, gender, and life-skills training,
which the adults did not. 
Naturally, the profile of the TRY group
members was different from that of the
adults in the K-Rep program, and this differ-
ence influenced the results of the project. In
the K-Rep program, the majority of mem-
bers were married women with children.
They were geographically stable and had
business experience. The members had com-
munity support structures (that is, friends
and family) and tended to be in their 30s
and 40s. 
The adolescent girls in the TRY project,
on the other hand, were younger than 24.
Two-thirds were unmarried and half had chil-
dren. This population was mobile; many had
come to Nairobi to find work, and conse-
quently they had few support structures. Most
(two-thirds) had no business experience. Some
had worked, but the majority were unem-
ployed when they entered the program.
There was also an institutional differ-
ence. For adults, the implementing agency
was K-Rep Bank. For the TRY project,
because it was experimental, the implement-
ing agency was the research and development
arm, KDA. The performance criteria for the
credit officers in the TRY project were differ-
ent from those for the K-Rep Bank credit
officers. For instance, the TRY officers had a
lower client load in the pilot phase (130 as
opposed to 350 clients per loan officer). 
Repayment started out well in the first
six months of the TRY pilot but then began
to decline. As repayments declined, girls
began dropping out. Those who dropped out
were mostly younger girls. Older girls were
more successful during the pilot phase.
Midway through the pilot (December 2000),
only one-fourth of the original borrowers
had received a second loan.3
3 At this time, 106 girls had received first loans
and 26 had received second loans.
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Phase Two
Based on the results of the pilot, Phase Two
was formulated, with some changes in
design. Recognizing the importance of social
networks created during the group forma-
tion, KDA and the Population Council
decided to add a social component by creat-
ing the part-time position of mentor, some-
one who would befriend and counsel the
girls. The position was envisioned as com-
plementary to the credit officer’s role.
Mentors were trained to counsel the girls in
a variety of areas including HIV/AIDS
transmission prevention, relationships,
entrepreneurship, and reproductive health.
Mentors specialized in different areas, and
all girls in the TRY program had access to all
of the mentors. The team of mentors devel-
oped activities for the girls’ groups and pre-
sented educational seminars. 
The program also required girls to have
a cosigner for their loans in order to
improve the rate of repayments. Additional
credit officers were recruited, and outreach
intensified.
The girls greatly appreciated having
access to mentors, according to the evalua-
tion. Attendance increased and group cohe-
sion seemed to improve, although repayment
continued to decline and girls continued to
drop out. Savings remained flat. 
Phase Three
In response to these results, Phase Three
began with a review of the issue of savings,
refocusing on safe and accessible savings:
“safe” because girls had reported that they
did not want to tell family (husbands or par-
ents) about their savings, and “accessible”
because they wanted to be able to use their
savings whenever they needed them. 
During this phase, the girls were
encouraged to form Young Savers Clubs,
groups that mimicked traditional rotating
savings and credit associations (RoSCAs)
and that were independent from the credit
and savings groups. Savings were held in an
account managed by K-Rep. Often the 
mentors led the savings groups. Each girl
kept a passbook in which her savings contri-
butions were recorded, and she could 
withdraw money from her account at any
time by filling out a withdrawal slip. The
girls themselves determined the amounts
that they saved voluntarily. Young Savers
Clubs met weekly and also engaged in recre-
ational activities. In this phase, KDA also
instituted a requirement for physical assets
for collateral.
Nearly all the TRY girls joined a Young
Savers Club. The amount of savings
increased considerably. Younger girls contin-
ued to drop out. 
FINDINGS
The majority of the dropouts during the
pilot phase and subsequent phases of the
project occurred for four reasons: (1) girls’
lack of access to their savings; (2) pressure to
take out and repay loans; (3) delays in loan
disbursement; and (4) the business plan
requirement. 
Lack of access to savings
In the evaluation, one of the girls’ most fre-
quently voiced complaints was that they were
not able to access their savings, even for
emergencies. In this microfinance model, the
savings serve as collateral for the loans, and
the only way that a girl could use her savings
in an emergency was to withdraw from the
program. The evaluation showed that many
girls were members of RoSCAs before they
entered the TRY program or had started
RoSCAs after joining it. This finding high-
lighted the importance to the girls of savings,
which they used for emergencies and for pur-
chases. The savings-as-collateral requirement
was either not clearly explained to the girls
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or they did not understand the explanation,
which caused mistrust and increased the
dropout rate.
Pressure to take out and repay loans
The girls disliked the pressure they were
under to take out and repay loans. To stay in
the groups, the girls had to continue borrow-
ing even when they could not manage the
repayments. As mentioned above, there was
no option for “resting,” that is, for remaining
in the group without taking a loan (a feature
of the adult model). The constant pressure to
make loan repayments contributed to their
dropping out. Dropping out carried a social
cost as well: Girls who had gained friends
and social support from group co-members
sometimes lost these friends and networks if
they started having repayment problems as a
result of the social pressure created by the
solidarity guarantee (see below).
Delays in loan disbursement
An additional problem that the girls men-
tioned was that obtaining a loan took too
long (on average, six months and sometimes
as long as 30 months). First, an eight-week
precredit training was required, and some
girls became impatient and dropped out
before receiving their loans. Second, delays in
loan disbursement occurred because of the
group-based credit methodology that required
the girls in a watano who had already
received their loans to be up to date in their
repayments before other members of their
watano could receive loans. Despite this
delay, those members who were awaiting their
loans were required to keep saving. When
repayments began to drop, disbursement was
delayed for other members who needed loans.
Finally, there were delays due to manage-
ment issues and bureaucracy. The program
was small and new, and it suffered a number
of management changes. It was understaffed
as well. Some K-Rep staff felt that adolescent
girls were not an appropriate market. The
pilot was implemented outside of the normal
microfinance activities of the institution by
the research and development arm. A conse-
quence of these management issues was that
the TRY pilot did not receive the careful
attention that it needed, and this lack of
attention caused implementation problems. 
The business plan requirement
The mid-term evaluation found that some
girls had dropped out because of the business
plan requirement. They found it intimidat-
ing, complicated, and illogical. Loan sizes
and terms often did not match the require-
ments of their business plans.  Many of the




The results of the TRY initiative are com-
pared below to a best practice financial serv-
ices perspective, that is, to widely disseminat-
ed standards that have been developed over a
number of years by the microfinance com-
munity, including donors, investors, and
practitioners.4
Lack of access to savings
Best practice microfinance stipulates that sav-
ings should be voluntary and accessible, and
the results of this pilot illustrate why. The
TRY program helped members accumulate
savings, but locked up the savings so that
they were unavailable for the girls’ needs.
The only way that girls could access their
savings was to drop out, and so they did.
This problem had been mitigated in the
adult model by means of creating an emer-
gency fund, but the girls’ model had no such
6
4 See, for example, the website 
www.microfinancegateway.org.
fund. Most girls were already saving in
RoSCAs, through which savings are multi-
plied by contributions from other RoSCA
members. The collected savings are given to
a different member at each meeting. This
lump sum is accessible for emergencies or
purchases. In other words, the girls were
already implementing best practice microfi-
nance via their RoSCAs. Because the girls
had no previous exposure to formal lending
institutions, they did not understand the
concept of savings as collateral and did not
comprehend why their savings in the TRY
program should be inaccessible. As a result,
they dropped out.
Pressure to take out and repay loans
The social pressure created by the group
methodology apparently had the negative
effect of worsening dropout rather than the
positive effect of ensuring repayment. In the
adult program, group members were part of
social networks that existed prior to group
formation. In contrast, in the TRY program,
the girls started without such support and
formed these social networks as the program
progressed. Because of the newness and
fragility of the girls’ social structures in the
groups, the pressure from their group mem-
bers to make loan repayments led to the
breakdown of group cohesiveness and caused
an increase in dropouts. 
In best practice microfinance, social
pressure is used instead of physical collateral
to ensure repayment, because the poor often
have no physical assets. The model stipulates
that the group members are known to each
other, thus ensuring that each person is
responsive to pressure from other members.
In the TRY program, the girls did not know
each other before joining. Consequently, the
result was the opposite of what was intended:
the breakdown of the group rather than the
successful repayment of loans. 
Delays in loan disbursement
Years of microfinance history as well as
numerous client-satisfaction studies have
shown that speed of disbursement is
extremely important to borrowers. Because
disbursement in this program was slow, girls
dropped out. This finding is consistent with
results from adult credit programs. The aver-
age time for loan disbursement in the adult
K-Rep program was two months, but much
longer in the TRY program. Faced with such
delays, girls reacted as adults do, by dropping
out. The added benefits of being in a group
apparently could not counteract the effect of
the delays.
The business plan requirement
The business plan requirement was probably
unnecessary. Business plans are costly to pro-
duce both from the client’s and the MFI’s
perspective because of the time they take.
Most microcredit programs do not use them
for group lending, even for new businesses.
Too much pressure may have been placed on
the girls to produce a business plan, which
contributed to their dropping out of the pro-
gram. Business training, introduced in a later
phase of the TRY program, was a more
appropriate response to the girls’ lack of busi-
ness skills.5
RECOMMENDATIONS
A combination of actions, rather than any one
action by K-Rep, was recommended by evalu-
ators to help reduce the number of dropouts.
Make savings flexible
The evaluators recommended that the sav-
ings component be made more flexible.
Some microfinance programs allow clients to
withdraw their savings, within limits, during
7
5 Phase Four is planned to address members’ 
financial literacy.
the loan term. Some allow clients to use
their savings at the end of the term to pay
off their loan balances. Because the members
of the TRY project who belonged to
RoSCAs were already accustomed to having
access to accumulated savings at certain
times, that sort of model would have been
useful. At the very least, the girls should
have had access to some part of their savings
at the end of each loan term. An emergency
fund would have been another option for
making money available to girls when they
need it. This option, however, involves a
financial cost for the girls that the with-
drawal of savings does not: the interest rate
that is charged. It also has a management
cost, because someone, whether the group 
or the loan officer, must monitor the 
emergency fund.
Reduce social pressure
The problems with the group methodology
for adolescent and vulnerable girls related to:
(1) the mechanism used for disbursements
(“staggering”) and (2) the mechanism used
to ensure repayments (the solidarity guaran-
tee). There are two reasons why MFIs use a
group methodology. The first is to reduce
costs. By grouping people and then disburs-
ing and recovering loans in the group, the
costs to the MFI are lower than if the 
MFI disbursed to individuals. The second
reason is that the formation of a group 
creates social pressure on members to repay.
This pressure works as an alternative form 
of collateral.
Two components of the TRY group
methodology produced social pressure for
repayment. The first was the disbursement
mechanism: the staggering of loan disburse-
ments. In the Grameen methodology, upon
which the K-Rep adult model and the TRY
pilot were based, members receive their loans
in a staggered fashion, two by two, with the
fifth person following last. In other words,
no one in the watano received a loan unless
all of the loans that have already been dis-
bursed are paid up. This system puts pressure
on borrowers to repay their loans on time. 
The second component is the solidarity
guarantee. According to this requirement, if
some members default, that is, if any unpaid
balance remains at the end of the loan term,
the other members of the watano and then
the kiwa (if necessary) have to pay the bal-
ance from their savings or from other
sources. This requirement also puts pressure
on the borrowers to make their repayments
on time. 
In the TRY program, the two mecha-
nisms of social pressure did not work as
planned. The staggering of disbursements
meant that very few members received loans,
and when they began having problems
repaying, all other loan disbursements 
were delayed, causing frustration and 
producing a high dropout rate. The 
staggering of disbursements created a 
ripple effect: more girls dropped out so that
they would not have to pay the debts of
those who had defaulted. 
The solidarity guarantee did not work
partly because the girls were not part of
established social networks before the pro-
gram began. Once they felt the social pres-
sure, they found it easier to drop out than to
repay their loans. 
The recommendation resulting from
these findings is to eliminate or modify the
methodological components that create the
social pressure, and then re-evaluate their
impact. Because the evaluation stated that
the girls dropped out because of delays in
disbursement due to the waiting require-
ment, one option is to eliminate the waiting
requirement. Instead, an MFI could disburse
loans to all clients at the same time. Ideally,
the methodological components that create
this social pressure should be modified. No
proof has been found that staggering dis-
bursements increases repayment; many MFIs
do not use this system. With the alternative
disbursement system, all members could
have received at least one loan to work with;
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this method also would provide richer data
concerning the effect of credit and savings
on girls’ livelihoods.6 Variations of this
method include granting individual loans or
forming smaller solidarity groups with
stronger and/or pre-existing social ties.
Either of these options would have the
added benefit of speeding up disbursements.
The second recommendation for reduc-
ing social pressure, then, is to eliminate the
solidarity guarantee and search for other
mechanisms for ensuring repayment.7 One
option would be to link access to loans to
the nonfinancial services offered through the
pilot, which were in demand. In other
words, if a girl missed a payment, she could
not come to the next meeting unless she
brought the payment. This option potential-
ly could have adverse effects, so it should be
tested first on a small scale. Another option
might be to accept partial payments of the
weekly loan amount, in effect treating the
loan like a line of credit, where any amount
of repayment is acceptable.
A third recommendation would be to
allow girls to “rest” between cycles, so that
they can continue to be part of the group,
participate in group activities, and save 
without taking a loan. This method reduces
pressure on members and allows them to
continue to receive the benefits of belonging
to the group. 
Eliminate the business plan requirement
The purpose of the business plan require-
ment was to lower the risk to the MFI of
lending to new businesses, a risk that MFIs
prefer to avoid. In this case, the requirement
did not have the desired effect, but rather
intimidated the clients and slowed down dis-
bursements. It was discarded, as it should
have been, in the second phase, and was
replaced with business training. Eliminating
the business plan requirement reduced the
cost to the institution in terms of the credit
officer’s time.
Lower loan amounts and shorten terms
The girls received standardized loans based
on the adult methodology rather than on the
business needs and experience of the borrow-
ers. The loan terms were long, designed to
reduce the size of monthly payments.
Reducing the size of a loan and the length of
the repayment term is a better solution.
Young people may benefit from immediate
positive reinforcement and may be better
served by smaller and shorter-term loans that
they can pay back more easily.
This recommendation may have several
positive effects: (1) it reduces the pressure of
repayment; (2) it increases the speed of dis-
bursements to the group; (3) it reduces the
losses to the MFI due to default; and (4) it
reduces the dropout rate. In this way, some
of the girls would have been able to pay off
their loans with less difficulty. As a result,
they would have had a positive learning
experience and been allowed another, poten-
tially larger loan, according to this system.
Additionally, if loan terms had been shorter
and the members had had access to their sav-
ings at the end of the loan term, the dropout
rate might have been reduced.
Nonmethodological issues
The most important institutional issue that
came out of the TRY program was the
tradeoff in using the research and develop-
ment arm of the MFI, KDA, to implement
the program, rather than K-Rep itself. One
advantage of using KDA was that K-Rep
was not distracted from its core mission,
nor was its attention diverted from its core
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6 These loans would also need to be for smaller
amounts and shorter terms, to reduce the risk to
the MFI. See the section on “Lower loan amounts
and shorten terms.”
7 Many MFIs do not use the guarantee for their
group lending for the reason that it penalizes the
best clients. The solidarity guarantee also becomes
more complicated as an MFI ages and the loan
amounts within a group begin to differ greatly.
clientele. Another advantage was that it
allowed for flexibility and experimentation
at the initial stage of the pilot that would
not have been possible within the context of
K-Rep’s formal banking environment. The
disadvantage was that the justification for
the project became social rather than prof-
itable or financial. Although the program’s
designers recognized the importance of
addressing both social and financial needs
of adolescent girls and young women, mon-
itoring suffered and best practices were not
respected. 
Institutional buy-in is a phrase heard
repeatedly in discussions of new products
and new target groups for MFIs. If sufficient
support or interest among MFI staff does
not exist, or if the rationale behind the
innovations is not well explained or justified,
problems will result. One reason that the
TRY program suffered from insufficient
staffing and delays in disbursements was that
K-Rep Bank staff were not completely sup-
portive of the new market focus. Many felt
that young, vulnerable girls would not be
appropriate clients, and that the effort to
serve them would be too risky. Others recog-
nized the role of the project in preparing
young women to become good K-Rep Bank
clients, and indeed several TRY participants
are now clients of K-Rep Bank. “Incubators”
such as the TRY program, which serve to
prepare and position vulnerable adolescents
to take advantage of future livelihood oppor-
tunities, is one strategy for creating new
markets for MFIs as well as for meeting
social objectives. It is imperative that man-
agement convince staff of the need for con-
trolled experimentation. 
The TRY evaluators pointed out that
management’s lack of monitoring caused
delays in disbursements, which, in turn,
caused dropout. In the pilot phase, only one
credit officer was assigned to the  program,
which proved to be insufficient. More credit
officers were added in later phases. MFIs that
are attempting to roll out pilot programs
must provide adequate staff and sufficient
support for the effort. Otherwise, the results
will be questionable no matter how good the
product may be. 
In the second phase, mentors were intro-
duced, solving part of the problem of social
support for the girls. However, this change
created tension between the mentors, who
supported the girls when they had repayment
problems, and the credit officers, who were
responsible for maintaining high repayment
levels. The two positions had conflicting per-
formance goals. Providing mentoring outside
of the financial services program might have
worked better. 
The pilot program was expensive, as
pilots normally are. However, excellent find-
ings were produced from the pilot, including
the fact that vulnerable girls can and do save.
MFIs can build on the lessons from the TRY
pilot in developing more cost-effective ways






This brief should not be viewed as a substi-
tute for reading the TRY program docu-
ments mentioned above, which are much
more detailed. Microfinance practitioners
who are interested in working with vulnera-
ble young people, especially adolescent girls,
should read these documents before attempt-
ing to design a program for reaching such
populations. 
The TRY program proved definitively
that vulnerable girls can and will save. This
finding is arguably the most important result
of the initiative, and one that all MFIs
should note. Girls need to save, and they will
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form their own groups for doing so if there
are no alternatives. MFIs should, therefore,
develop savings products that mimic or
improve upon girls’ RoSCAs. 
Savings and credit products for girls
should be flexible, adaptable, optional, and
simple. There is no point in forcing girls to
take out loans that they are not ready for, or
to save a fixed amount on a rigid schedule,
or to lock up their savings. These require-
ments do not serve this clientele well.
Knowing girls’ needs and listening to their
opinions are key elements of designing suit-
able products. This study reinforced other
microfinance studies that show that listening
to clients is crucial to offering a well-
designed product. It is also crucial to under-
stand the differences among clients, what is
known in the microfinance world as “market
segmentation.” The TRY program showed
that the group “vulnerable adolescent girls”
was, in fact, two groups: younger girls who
did not want the pressure of taking out a
loan and older girls with some business expe-
rience who were able to handle loan repay-
ments. Members of this latter group, in both
the urban slum and the rural pilots, were
more successful at conducting their business-
es and at repaying their loans.
Girls need training in financial and busi-
ness skills to help them become successful.
Many have no business experience, and most
have no credit experience. Ideally, they need
to be taught these skills without the pressure
of repaying a loan. Microfinance institutions
might consider linking with organizations
that are already providing social support net-
works in health education, vocational train-
ing, life-skills training, and other areas.
MFIs need to continue to look for alter-
natives for collateral. This program went
backward in terms of collateral, becoming
stricter instead of more flexible. First the sav-
ings were withheld, then cosigners were
required, then physical assets were required.
The net result was an increased dropout 
rate. MFIs must find other ways to 
reduce risk.
The interest rate subsidy of 15 percent
rather than the 18 percent required of adults
appeared to have neither negative nor 
positive impact. Rather than making general-
ized assumptions about what rate vulnerable
populations can afford, MFIs should use
market interest rates unless compelling 
evidence is found that a benefit accrues from
subsidizing them. 
Microfinance practitioners who work in
post-conflict situations will appreciate the
safety issue involved in dealing with groups
that handle cash. This issue is particularly
important when clients are female, young,
and living in a slum. This combination of
characteristics and demographics makes them
far more vulnerable than adults in other 
circumstances and greatly increases the
responsibility of program designers to take
safety into account. 
Finally, designers of programs for young
people should recognize that girls have trans-
action costs. They are involved in many
livelihood strategies for survival, and new
activities to reach them should fit into their
existing strategies rather than forcing them to
make choices between strategies.
Microfinance practitioners are 
encouraged to take the lessons learned from
this innovative program and to build upon
them in order to meet the needs of vulnera-
ble girls and other marginalized, at-risk pop-
ulations. Market research, client segmenta-
tion, and new product development should
be part of every institution’s mandate. In this
way, MFIs can create new markets, build
client loyalty, establish market niches, and,
most important, meet their social missions. 
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